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Abstract | This article traces the trajectory of discourses on population through fertility 
surveys administered in Japan in the 1940s and 1950s and unpacks their political 
significance. During this period, the frame through which Japan viewed population 
evolved rapidly from “overpopulation theory” to “declining population society theory/
population resource theory” to “birth control theory.” Until the 1930s, the problem of 
overpopulation in rural areas was severe, and the Japanese state attempted to resolve the 
issue through industrialization and overseas immigration. However, the Japanese 
government did not consider birth control as an alternative measure by which to 
address the problem. During this era, following the First World War, there was a notion 
of the period as the “total-war era,” in which populations were identified as a physical 
resource. Additionally, eyeing European states that had transitioned into societies with 
declining populations and deeming their powers weakened by this development, Japan 
endeavored to learn from their perceived mistakes. In 1940, Japan’s Ministry of Health 
and Welfare observed differences in fertility across the urban-rural divide, as well as 
differences between careers, via a fertility survey. The Population Policy Establishment 
Guidelines (Jinkō seisaku kakuritsu yōkō, 1941) were enacted on the basis of this survey. 
However, during the US occupation period, the population discourse in Japan quickly 
transitioned toward one of population control via birth control. With the return of 
populations from the Asian mainland and a baby boom following defeat in the Second 
World War, Japanese society faced the twin problems of unemployment and poverty. 
Birth control emerged as a direct means of resolving these problems. Furthermore, 
birth control was envisioned as a virtue of civil subjectivity that could guarantee the 
“quality” of the population while also determining a rational family size. By subsidizing 
the research costs incurred by conducting fertility surveys, as well as expanding 
scholarly exchanges for Japanese demographic researchers, private US foundations, 
headed by the Rockefeller Foundation, played a crucial role in the transition of 
population discourses in Japan. Meanwhile, an obsession with racial “purity” and the 
supposed superiority of the Japanese national population has always existed as a part of 
population discourses in Japan. Prior to 1945, the results of Japan’s fertility surveys were 
subject to comparisons with those in China, the USSR, and India, and utilized in a 
manner that prompted a security crisis. A sense of crisis concerning high fertility rates 
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among colonized populations was also acute. This spurred attempts by the Japanese 
state to remove minority populations following 1945. It is necessary to re-examine the 
grand life-cycle of the Japanese populace from an overpopulated society to a low-birth-
rate, aging society within the historical context of “population discourse/political 
constructions of representation.”
Keywords | politics of population, fertility survey, fertility control/birth control, 
Population Policy Establishment Guidelines (1941), General Headquarters of the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP), Rockefeller Foundation, 
ethnic minority groups
Introduction
Practices, discourses, and politics related to fertility in East Asian countries 
underwent monumental change throughout the twentieth century. In the not-
so-distant past, the daily lives of societies and countries in the region were 
inundated with the campaigns that constantly warned of the crisis of 
overpopulation and impediments to economic development, and promoted 
population control by means of contraception. In the present day, in which 
crises of low fertility and aging societies abound, it is hard not to be astonished 
by just how much has changed over the past century.
The first survey to focus on behaviors involving reproduction and fertility in 
East Asia, and to attempt to intervene, was a fertility survey1 conducted system- 
atically and on a nationwide scale in Japan in 1940. Its goal was comprehensively 
to collect data on births, which up until that point had been quantified in only a 
limited fashion through the national census (kokusei chōsa, first conducted in 
1920). Although of course academic interest was a factor behind the under- 
taking, a practical interest in observing demographic phenomena within the 
Japanese empire’s territories in order to regulate them through law and to be 
able to respond to problems in reality was also at the root of it. Numerous social 
and historical contexts, such as securing the political status of the Japanese 
“ethnic population,” the handling of rural populations, which had been drawing 
1. Fertility survey: A survey for the purpose of studying the level of fertility of a country and 
region, or for uncovering factors which may be affecting levels of fertility in said country or 
region. Surveys are taken of either married women or couples, and consist of questions on basic 
demographic information regarding date of birth, date of marriage, as well as questions about 
socio-economic attributes such as levels of education and career, and questions regarding value 
consciousness toward children, dates of birth of children, and methods of birth control, among 
others. 
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attention as a social issue, the mobilization of population resources during the 
“total-war era,” as well as the reproduction of that population, and “democratic 
civil subjectivity” and population control following the Second World War, all 
acted as crucial external factors affecting the survey. It was only possible 
because the findings of the fertility survey were acknowledged as the baseline 
data from which long-term demographic inferences could be made. This 
suggests that the data also became the foundation for political and policy action 
that would transform real-world practices and customs. 
Numerous studies of the history of birth control and population control 
conducted by scholars in Japan confirm this. Most prominently, while high- 
lighting the significance of the women’s birth control movement (bodily 
autonomy/the choice to reproduce), Fujime Yuki (2004, 358) arrived at the 
overall conclusion that “if Japan’s wartime population policy (pro-natalist policy) 
could be said to be ‘Nazi Germanization,’ then the birth control movement and 
changes in population policy following the war were [Japan’s] ‘Americanization.’” 
One could say that Fujime reconstructed the state’s sexual/reproductive regula- 
tions from a gender perspective. Later, Ogino Miho (2008) investigated the 
intersections of perspectives of the state, the individual, and the foreign states 
involved in birth control from an actor’s level. In doing so, Ogino brought to 
light the political significance of birth control, originating in an individual’s 
“free choice.” However, these two pieces of research not only paid insufficient 
attention to the significance of fertility surveys, which formed the basis of the 
birth control movement and policies, but also failed to comprehend accurately 
the existence of an ethno-politics based on population—in particular, the 
political significance of colonial populations living within the empire’s territory 
at the time. 
There is a dearth of research on this subject in Korean academia. It goes 
without saying that studies of Japan’s fertility surveys are limited, but even 
studies that analyze the significance of surveying and measuring populations at 
the time are very hard to come by. For example, Pak Myŏng-gyu and Sŏ 
Ho-ch’ŏl’s (2003) study of the census of colonial Korea is the only one of its kind. 
In it, Pak and Sŏ identify the significance of the exercise as a “civilizing enterprise” 
by the Japanese Governor-General of Korea. Their article shares a similar 
perspective with Satō Masahiro’s (2002) research, which views Japan’s census as 
an act of “proving it to be a civilized nation” in order to revise its unequal treaties 
with Euro-American powers. Next, there is Yi Chŏng-sŏn’s (2013) research, which 
delineates just how unions between members of different ethnic groups—for 
example, Japanese and Korean—including issues of “international marriage” and 
“miscegenation” were understood in the realm of eugenics at the time. Addition- 
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ally, we have So Hyŏn-suk’s (2000) research, which uncovers traces of birth 
control discourses in colonial Korea. Overall, it is not hard to see that the studies 
are severely limited to research tracing Japan’s population politics only in respect 
of colonial Korea, or research focusing on the eugenic aspects of population 
politics. 
This article seeks to demystify the historical momentum—for example, the 
entrance into total war and the transition in perceptions of demographics, as 
well as the reordering of perceptions of demographics following Japan’s defeat in 
1945 and the introduction of the General Headquarters of the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP) and private foundations—
which exists within the life-cycle of Japan’s population politics, and to shed light 
on its significance. Specifically, it intends to situate at the center of its analysis 
the agenda of reproducing the population, an idea which was raised amid 
intense interest at the time, and in particular, various surveys and policy actions 
related to the field of fertility. As previously mentioned, fertility surveys were an 
attempt to obtain information that could not be acquired through alternative 
official demographic statistics. Their purpose was to regularly survey the 
circumstances and background factors regarding marriage and couples’ fertility, 
and to obtain baseline data necessary for comprehending demographic trends, 
including related measures and future demographic estimates. The fertility 
surveys conducted in Japan during the 1940s and 1950s are vastly important in 
that they provided the baseline data from which their executors were able to 
gauge and forecast the directions in which the entirety of the population would 
be moving in the future. 
The resources which this article makes use of are discussions found in the 
Journal of Population Problems (Jinkō mondai kenkyū), published by the Institute 
of Population Problems (Jinkō Mondai Kenkyūjo), as well as its various other 
publications. The Institute of Populations Problems was both an organization 
housed under the Ministry of Health and Welfare and also the supervising 
institution of the fertility surveys, in addition to being the assembly point for 
Japanese demographers of the time. Utilizing these sources, I will reveal in clear 
terms how Japan’s population politics transformed over different eras, from the 
perspective of birth control. Additionally, given that Japan’s population politics 
are deeply interrelated to issues of managing colonial populations, I will provide 
analysis and discussion of these issues as well. 
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War and Transitions in Perceptions of Population 
1. “Rural Overpopulation Theory” in Japan and its Alternatives
Demographics first began to be recognized as a social issue in modern Japan 
with the Rice Riots (Kome Sōdō) of 1918. Although population theories such as 
“race improvement theory” and “settler migration theory” had been discussed 
among the intelligentsia from the beginnings of the Meiji era, these were simple 
overpopulation theories stemming from a dense population living on a limited 
area of land. However, following 1918, population problems began to be expressed 
as overpopulation theory in connection with issues of food production and 
unemployment (Takazawa 1992, 104). During this era, the Committee for the 
Inquiry into the Population’s Food Problems (Jinkō Shokuryō Mondai Chōsakai, 
1927-30) was established by the government, and took as its core agenda the 
enactment of immigration measures, adjustments to the supply and demand of 
labor, population regulation measures, measures to increase production, and the 
establishment of the Ministry of Social Affairs. This institution’s mission was 
continued with the setting up of the Research Association for Population 
Problems (Jinkō Mondai Kenkyūkai, est. 1933). The Research Association for 
Population Problems conducted preliminary surveys of demographic pheno- 
mena, made predictions on population outcomes, and surveyed the distribution 
of citizen’s incomes, as well as immigration and population control (Sugita 2013, 
98).  
Primarily, Japanese demographers exhibited a clear interest in rural popula- 
tions. Measures such as fortifying industry, fostering migration to urban areas 
and abroad, and birth control were repeatedly brought up as means by which to 
absorb excess rural populations. In particular, as urban unemployment and rural 
poverty grew acute during the recession following the late 1920s, population 
problems were underscored. Referring to population problems as an issue 
associated with the foundation of a national life, commercialist population 
theorist Ueda Teijirō claimed: “The problem of overpopulation can be resolved 
through further accelerating the process of industrialization. We must integrate 
the youth population who have left rural areas by expanding the labor market.” 
He once even said that rural areas were the “nurseries and nursing homes for 
the modern city” (Adachi 2013, 75). Eminent agricultural policy scholar Nasu 
Shirosi shared the opinion that overpopulation in rural areas could be dealt with 
by increasing the employment capacity of businesses through industrial 
development. That said, he was concerned that if such a change were to happen, 
it would be inevitable that the number of agricultural workers would shrink, 
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leading to a decline in agricultural production. That is, he was concerned that a 
food shortage could arise (Cho Chŏng-u 2014, 26-27). 
Up until this point, measures that would intervene in fertility—birth control—
had failed to gain much interest from either state institutions or scholars. This 
was due to their being an overwhelmingly private affair, and thus giving little 
assurance that they could achieve their desired ends through government 
intervention. In addition, this disinterest in birth control owed much to the 
dominant view of the time, which understood the demographic phenomena 
ascertained through the results of the census not from the viewpoint of the 
future of industry, but from a demographic perspective concerned with long-
term effects. In particular, the latter adopted a view of “demographic transition,”2 
which claimed that population growth would, at some point, stagnate due to the 
death rate and declining birth rates, after which point the overall population 
would begin to decline. Given declining birth rates in a number of European 
countries following the First World War, concerns that Japan was headed in the 
same direction (“declining population theory”) deepened. Changes in birth rates 
recorded following the first national census (1920) were widely discussed as the 
basis for these concerns. This perspective became the basis of the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare’s Wartime Population Policy (Adachi 2013, 76). 
As population issues took on a new meaning with the advent of the total-
war era following the First World War, this perspective was further fortified. As 
is widely known, “total war” refers to large-scale war mobilization, which of 
course includes dispatching mass armies to battlefields, and also the mobilization 
of all national, social, and economic resources for the sole purpose of war 
(Förster and Gessler 2005, 56). Japan experienced the First World War in the 
capacity of limited battles against German troops in the European power’s 
Chinese colony of Qingdao. Additionally, it experienced the conflict in the form 
of the colossal profits made by dominating the market for wartime supplies in 
the midst of the “battlefieldization of all of Europe.” And with the establishment 
of the Temporary Military Investigative Commission (Rinji Gunji Chōsa Iinkai) 
within the Ministry of War in late 1915, Japan collected systematic information 
regarding the events unfolding on European battlefields. For the collection of 
information on the war, army major-generals were dispatched to European 
nations as military observers. The chief strategist of this era was Nagata Tetsuzan, 
2. In Korean academic circles, this phenomenon is referred to as demographic transition (in’gu 
pyŏnch’ŏn). In demographic transition theory, concerns about population decline are not 
prominent. However, in mid-1930s Japan, the development of demographic changes that 
corresponded to this “demographic transition” appear within a particular moment of crisis. For the 
sake of clarity, I have chosen to use the term “demographic transition” (in’gu chŏnhwan).
 Japanese Population Politics  145
who was often referred to as the brain of the Control Faction (Tōseiha). He 
authored the Opinion on Total Mobilization (Kokka sōdōin ni kansuru ikensho, 
1920) which comprised the overall opinion of the Temporary Military 
Investigative Commission. In this text, he emphasized the total mobilization of 
physical and material resources. He stipulated that in the concept of total mobi- 
lization, the distinctions between people and resources, spiritual and material, 
metaphysical and physical were dissolved, and that humans were subject to 
mobilization as a type of material resource. The assignment of regulations to all 
resources, functions, and facilities identified by state powers was the central task 
of the times, and population emerged as the central subject of this mobilization 
(Kim In-soo 2016, 96-99; Umemori 1999, 35-39). Increasing the population was 
a task of utmost urgency necessitated by the era of total war, in which a war of 
attrition was inevitable. 
It appears that colonial Korea, where the problem of rural overpopulation 
was even more acute than in Japan, had no particular stance on birth control. 
Rather, various limitations implicit in Korea’s agricultural production, such as 
the small allocations of cultivation acreage, the crudeness of the organic com- 
position of agricultural capital (which was labor-intensive in comparison to the 
introduction of mechanical capital), and an overdependency on intensive labor 
performed by hand, were considered the essential problems. At this time, the 
“surplus population” found in rural colonial Korea signified the “over-
concentration of the labor capacity of family members of a farming family 
invested in the agricultural sector, as made apparent by the meager acreages for 
cultivation and low standards of technology” (Yukiyama 1943, 41). Almost no 
agenda had been proposed regarding fertility in colonial Korea,3 and birth 
control was excluded from measures to relieve population pressures. 
2.  The Crisis of Reproducing the Population: Social Implications of Fertility 
Surveys
In order to regulate and manage the quality and quantity of human resources, 
Japan’s Ministry of Health and Welfare was established at the request of the 
military in January 1938. The Research Association for Population Problems, 
which had been set up in 1933, was reborn under the auspices of the Ministry of 
3. Examples of fertility surveys conducted in colonial Korea are extremely rare. Attesting to this, 
there were two fertility surveys: one conducted on February 6, 1944 in five prefectures (fu); and 
one conducted between February and March of the same year in five villages. For information 
regarding the contents of the surveys, see Chōsen Sōtoku Kanbō Chōsaka (1944a, 45-60; 1944b, 
57-77). 
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Health and Welfare as the Institute of Population Problems (August 25, 1939; 
Imperial order No. 603).4 Within the Bureau of Prevention (Yōbōkyoku) at the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare, a Eugenic Section (Yūseika) was opened, and in 
addition to this, the Racial Hygiene Study Group (Minzoku Eisei Kenkyūkai), 
which introduced various eugenic measures, was also created. In 1942, the 
Institute of Population Problems was merged with the public health service and 
other research institutions within the Ministry of Health and Welfare into the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare Research Institute (Kōseishō Kenkyūjo), under 
4. According to the Administrative Regulations and Bylaws of the Institute of Population Problems 
(Jinkō mondai kenkyūjo jimu bunshō kisoku saisoku, October 18, 1939), the Research Department 
(Chōsabu) was made up of three groups. The first was in charge of demographic theory, 
demographic history, population policy, demographic statistics, the circumstances of populations 
living abroad, as well as survey research for policy. The second group was in charge of theories of 
race as well as survey research on ethnic policies from both the social sciences and natural sciences 
perspectives. The third group was in charge of sociological, economic, geographical, and social 
policy survey research on population problems (Jinkō mondai kenkyūjo kansei 1940, 69).
Source:  Okazaki (1995); Statistics and Information Department, Cabinet Secretariat, 
Ministry of Health and Welfare (n.d.), as quoted in Institute for International 
Cooperation Japan International Cooperation Agency (2003, 18). 
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which they were reorganized into the Population and Race Section (Jinkō 
Minzokubu). During this time, a number of laws related to the management of 
people’s reproduction were enacted between 1940 and 1941. Of these, one was 
the National Eugenic Act (proclaimed in 1940, enacted in July 1941); another 
was the Population Policy Establishment Guidelines (Jinkō seisaku kakuritsu 
yōkō), decided upon by the cabinet on January 22, 1941 (Ogino 2008, 112-14; 
Fujime 2004, 332). In accordance with these laws—save for instances of genetic 
disorders—birth control (i.e. contraception and abortion) was banned. Add- 
itionally, in order for a doctor to perform sterilization surgery or induce an 
abortion, s/he had to submit prior notice. Fertility control was characterized as 
an anti-national act. 
Figure 1 depicts Japan’s birth and mortality rates. The steady climb of the 
birth rate in the 1940s is striking. It is a well-documented fact that between 1947 
and 1949, nearly 8,060,000 babies were born, in what is called the “dankai sedai” 
or “baby-boomer” generation. However, the fact that even during the war, 
Source:  Date and Shimizutani (2004). This chart was created using data published in the 
National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (Kokuritsu Shakai 
Hoshō-Jinkō Mondai Kenkyūjo) publication the Journal of Population Problems 
(Jinkō mondai kenkyū) combined with data published each year in the Statistics 
and Information Department, Ministry of Health and Welfare (Kōsei Rōdōshō 
Tōkei Jōhōbu) publication Vital Statistics (Jinkō dōtai tōkei).
Figure 2. Japan’s total fertility rate trends* 
*Total Fertility Rate (TFR): An index of the average number of children a woman is 
expected to give birth to in her lifetime. If the fertility rate of a certain period in time for a 
certain age is applied to a woman throughout her childbearing years, it is an indicator of 
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between 1940 and Japan’s defeat in 1945, the birth rate showed growth had not 
been given sufficient attention. 
As shown in figure 2, following the 1920s, the total fertility rate in Japan was 
in general decline. The welfare authority interpreted this as an indication that an 
overall stagnation in population was transitioning into a decline, and that in the 
long-term, this would engender an aging society. At this point in time, France 
was on everyone’s lips as an example of a country with low birth rates in which 
there were “more elderly than youths,” and its early defeat at the hands of Nazi 
Germany, which itself had instituted a fierce population growth policy, reinforced 
the belief that the stature of a nation’s population was directly linked to its 
survival (Ogino 2008, 117). The Population Policy Establishment Guidelines 
(1941) were established on the basis of this crisis surrounding population decline. 
The Population Policy Establishment Guidelines proposed an objective of 
reaching a population of 100 million ethnic Japanese by 1960. This figure for the 
policy-planned “target population” was based on projections made by the 
Research Department at the Institute of Population Problems in 1940. According 
to those estimates, by 1950 Japan’s population would reach around 85 million, 
and by 2000 it would reach 120 million, after which it would begin to decline. 
Here we can see that there was not only a recognition of the total-war era in 
which population was consumed as a resource, but also that the need to actively 
rectify the “transition to a declining population society” was very much present. 
A policy measure that would lower the age of marriage by about three years 
over a decade, raising the number of children that couples would have to five, 
and encouraging the establishment of public health clinics in order to drastically 
reduce the infant mortality rate, was advanced.5 Furthermore, curiously, a “forty 
5. These were the principle contents of the “measures to increase births” portion of Section Four: 
Measures for Population Increase in the Population Policy Establishment Guidelines. The 
following were also included. 
     •  The maintenance/reinforcement of a wholesome family institution 
     •  The vitalization of marriage mediation by organizations and public institutions
     •  The alleviation of the costs of getting married and the establishment of a system of lending for 
marriage funds
     •  The interlocking of the in-progress school system reforms with population policy
     •  The strengthening of knowledge/technological education regarding sanitation and 
childbearing, as well as instilling the national calling of motherhood in girls’ high schools and 
schools for young women (fostering healthy motherhood)
     •  The regulation of employment of female workers over twenty years of age, and the 
improvement of employment requirements which become a hindrance to marriage
     •  The alleviation of tax burdens on those with many dependents, while simultaneously 
increasing the tax burden on those who are single
     •  The establishment of a family allowance system (creation of a Family Burden Control 
Financial System [working title])
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percent agricultural population theory” (nōgyō jinkō yon wari teiyū ron)6 was 
promoted, in which the farming population was to be maintained at forty percent 
of the total population. Foremost, there was a need to increase food production 
by means of guaranteeing secure agricultural production capacity. Second, 
because rural areas exhibited higher fertility than urban areas in multiple fertility 
surveys, maintaining and bolstering rural areas’ capacity to increase the popula- 
tion was viewed as a necessity (Adachi 2013, 77-78). 
It can be judged that the data undergirding the Population Policy Establish- 
ment Guidelines were the results of the fertility survey administered in 1940 by 
the Institution of Population Problems.7 To be more specific, as a differential 
fertility survey, it measured birth rates, birth rates by age, birth rates by occupa- 
tion, birth rates by income class, birth rates by education level, and birth rates by 
region. As of “Present: January 20, 1940 12:00 AM” the Institute of Population 
Problems had sampled 100,000 couples who were salaried workers such as 
government workers or bankers, wage laborers in the manufacturing/mining/
transportation sectors, rural residents, small and mid-sized business owners, 
and those belonging to the “card class” (kādo kaikyū),8 and distributed question- 
naires (figure 3) to them, administering the fertility survey (“Shussanryoku 
chōsa no shikō” 1940, 72). 
The results of this survey were published in July of the same year, in the 
     •  The consideration for commendations, priority distribution of goods, and other various 
methods of appropriate prioritization for multiple-child families
     •  The expansion of maternity hospitals (san’in) and nurseries, and the distribution of sanitary 
materials for childbirth
     •  The banning and prevention of artificial birth control methods such as contraception and 
abortion, and the simultaneous eradication of venereal diseases
6. This is enumerated in Section Five: Measures for the Increase of Talent in the Population Policy 
Establishment Guidelines. This article established the objective of promoting the rationalization of 
the population’s composition and distribution through land planning. In particular, it suggested 
that it must disperse populations by removal from large metropolitan areas. The dispersal of 
schools to rural areas was an example policy. Additionally, in view of the reality in which rural 
areas were the unparalleled sources of both troops and laborers, this gave rise to measures under 
which the rural population within Japan would be kept at a certain level, while securing forty 
percent of the Japanese population in Japan/Manchuria/Northern China for agriculture: the 
so-called “forty percent agricultural population theory.”
7. As for nationwide fertility surveys, the first was conducted in 1940, followed by the second in 
1952, after which they began to be conducted every five years under the name “Fertility Survey.” 
Following 1992, the name was changed to “Basic Survey on Birth Trends,” and it continues to be 
conducted to this day (Kokuritsu Shakai Hoshō-Jinkō Mondai Kenkyūjo 2017, 1).
8. The term “card class” come from the document in the form of a card on which the poor were 
listed by local social welfare committees (hōmen iin): the urban underclass who were recipients of 
official aid. 
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(Okazaki 1940). There were 126,627 
questionnaires distributed in total, 
and the number of questionnaires 
returned was 80,638. Among these, 
valid questionnaires (excluding 
partially completed questionnaires and 
the like) came to 71,606, or eighty-
nine percent. While explaining that 
survey data from a differentiated 
fertility survey of couples was abso- 
lutely necessary for the establishment 
of a population policy, but that no 
such survey had been conducted in 
Japan up to that point, the author of 
this text, Okazaki Ayanori, revealed 
that it was “the first systematic survey 
on a nationwide scale.” There had 
once been a survey administered in a 
restricted manner in the Tokyo region, 
but he added that there had been 
limitations in that (1) it had been 
unable to collect information on rural areas, and (2) due to it being a survey 
administered to the parents of primary school children, it had been completely 
unable to ascertain information on the status of infertile couples. If one examines 
the “number of children birthed by women who are no longer of a childbearing 
age (over forty-five)” section of the survey (table 1), the overall average was 4.64, 
exhibiting differences based on the occupation of the head of the family (the 
husband). 
If we were to exclude the most impoverished of these classes, the card class, 
farmers registered the highest birth rate—4.98. Despite their residence in rural 
areas, salaried workers and wage laborers registered numbers at the lower end of 
the scale. Additionally, the results of a survey of the “number of children by the 
wife’s occupation” led to the conclusion that “wives with occupations, particularly 
as teachers, office clerks, or those wives participating in factory work, have a 
severely deficient fertility rate, and thus from the perspective of the measures 
for population increase, it is not advisable for wives to work in these types of 
occupations” (Okazaki 1940, 21). 
Still, according to a report from the Institute of Population Problems in 1941 
Figure 3. Fertility questionnaire schedule 
(confidential)
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(Kōseishō Jinkō Mondai Kenkyūjo 1941), cities were showing lower stand- 
ardized birth rates in comparison with rural areas, with even lower numbers the 
larger the city was. Moreover, as time passed, this disparity between cities and 
rural areas widened, particularly when the scale of cities was taken into account. 
In general, the standardized birth rate of the industrial population showed 
parallels with that of cities, and the same trend was also confirmed in the so- 
called “cultural leisure class,” most accurately described as the “radio-listening 
generation.” In this manner, the report came to the conclusion that “in each 
region, the most decisive factor in the disparity of the capacity to increase 
population is fertility, rather than mortality, and we must acknowledge that the 
degree of culture has an inverse relationship with the capacity for population 
increase” (“Preface”).
In these fertility surveys and reports, there was a recognition of the disparities 
in regional fertility between urban and rural areas, while at the same time there 
was a displacement and reassessment of the significance of rural populations, 
which had been thought of as a social issue until the end of the war; that was, a 
transition in values is apparent. The most representative figure in this transfor- 
mation was Tachi Minoru9 of the Institute of Population Problems. Tachi was a 
proponent of taking the demographic perspective of the Population Policy 
Establishment Guidelines to the extreme. Assessing that the Japanese state’s land 
9. Tachi Minoru (1906-72): Tokyo Imperial University graduate. Entered the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare’s Institute of Population Problems in 1939 and became its head in 1959. Member of the 
United Nations Population Commission, served successively on the boards for the International 
Population Association and the International Statistics Association (https://kotobank.jp/word/%E9
%A4%A8%E7%A8%94-1089559. Accessed: March 14, 2018). 
Table 1. Average total number of children given birth to by women no longer of 
childbearing age, by class
Typical salaried worker 4.10
Rural salaried worker 4.06
Rural wage laborer 4.36
Farmer 4.98
Typical small to mid-sized business owner 4.17
Rural small to midsize business owner 4.00
Affluent class 4.53
Card class 5.18
Source: Okazaki (1940, 6).
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planning was too narrowly concentrated on “national security demands” or “the 
amplification of production capacity” and other types of “material aspects,” he 
asserted that land-planning policies must be subsumed and subordinate to the 
ultimate goal of population increase. Noticing the regional elements of demo- 
graphic phenomena, he suggested that there was a negative correlation between 
urbanization and fertility.10 With these results as the groundwork, he went so far 
as to say that, for the sake of population increase, it was necessary to introduce 
anti-urbanization, anti-industrialization policies (Adachi 2013, 81-83). 
3.  The Crisis of Primacy of the Japanese Population: The Ethno-political 
Implications of Fertility Surveys
It is noteworthy about the Japanese government’s understanding of fertility that 
by comparing the country’s own birth rates with those of other nations—the 
USSR, China, and India—in the region in which Japan had declared itself the 
leading power, it strengthened the sense of crisis surrounding the decline of 
Japan’s ethnic population. Figure 4 is taken from a pamphlet put out at the time 
by the Ministry of Health and Welfare’s Bureau of Prevention. When we consider 
why it did not compare Japan’s population with those of Germany, France, or 
other European nations, it becomes apparent that it was the author’s intent to 
juxtapose birth rates of countries vying for hegemony over the East Asian region: 
China, the USSR, and India. It emphasizes that, compared with Japan’s birth rate 
of 26.7 per 1,000 in 1938, China boasted a rate of 45.0 (estimated value) while 
the USSR had a rate of 43.3 (Kōseishō Yobōkyoku 1941, 18). 
In the first volume of Population Problem Data (Kōseishō Jinkō Mondai 
Kenkyūjo n.d.), put out by the Institute of Population Problems, we can confirm 
the belief that because population is “the driving force for the nation and 
country’s prosperity, for Japan, which will become the leader of the East Asian 
nations, increasing their population is an urgent task” (7). The text’s author 
stresses that Japan must emulate the population policies of Nazi Germany and 
achieve population increase “through a spiritual movement based on a compre- 
hensive notion of the ethnic nation” (13). Additionally, they made clear the 
underlying relevance and significance of the Population Policy Establishment 
10. “The capacity for growth in towns accounts for only two-fifths of the standardized natural 
increase rate in rural areas. This means that the capacity for population increase in towns is only 
two-fifths of that in rural areas … The death rates in urban and rural areas are nearly at the same 
level, but because the birth rates in cities are far lower, this large disparity in the capacity for 
increase requires our attention. In short, this disparity in the capacity for increase between urban 
and rural areas stems from the differences in birth rates” (Tachi 1943, 215).
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Guidelines by stating: “First, we must 
become conscious of the fact that the 
Japanese nation is one which must always 
be developing; second, we must reject a 
worldview built on the basis of the indivi- 
dual, and instead thoroughly promote the 
establishment of a worldview built on the 
basis of the home (ie) and the nation; third, 
we must realize our pride and obligations 
as the leader in the establishment and 
development of the East Asian Co-Prosperity 
Sphere; fourth, we must thoroughly 
recognize that the accomplishment of the 
Empire’s missions can only be fulfilled on 
the basic condition of the rapid develop- 
ment of the Japanese (Naichijin) popula- 
tion both quantitatively and qualitatively” 
(14). 
It is imperative here to pay attention to 
what exactly the “rapid development of 
the native population” means. “Pure-blood 
racial theory” (junketsu minzoku ron) had a fierce hold over the minds of 
bureaucrats in the Ministry of Health and Welfare. Among those actively 
working at the Institute of Population Problems was Koya Yoshio (1890-1974), a 
professor at Kanazawa Medical University who played an instrumental role in 
making sure the activities of the Racial Hygiene Study Group were reflected in 
policies. He sympathized deeply with the ethnic and racial policies of the Nazis. 
Koya entered the Ministry of Health and Welfare in 1939, where he served as 
the head of the National Physical Fitness Section (Kokumin Tairyokubu-chō) at 
the Institute of Welfare Science (Kōsei Kagaku Kenkyūjo) as well as the head of 
the Science Division (Kagakubu) at the Ministry of Health and Welfare 
Research Institute, and took on the role of director of the Institute of Public 
Hygiene (Kōshū Eiseiinchō) following Japan’s defeat in the Second World War. 
Regarding Japanese colonies such as Taiwan and Korea, he asserted that they 
should not pursue “national assimilation” via miscegenation, but instead that 
Japanese settlers should be dispatched to construct Japanese rural areas on a 
large scale, so that Japanese farmers would “reoccupy” these places. For him and 
others in the eugenics sphere, the high rate of population increase in Korea was 
a cause for concern. They even considered the coercive name-change policy of 
Source: Kōseishō Yobōkyoku (1941, 19). 
Figure 4. Comparison of population 
and birth rates in India, the USSR, 
Japan, and China
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the Governor-General of Korea and the wartime mobilization of Korean people 
to Japan something that should be avoided to the greatest extent possible (Koya 
1939a, 1939b, as quoted in Oguma 2003, 325-27). As shown in the “East Asian 
Ethnic Population Policy” of the Examination of World Policy with Yamato 
Nation at the Center (Yamato minzoku o chūkaku to suru sekai seisaku no kentō, 
1943), published by the Ethnic Population Division (Jinkō Minzokubu) at the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare Research Institute, these thinkers considered it a 
problem that despite the high birth rates in Taiwan and Korea, their people were 
still not being assimilated. The following five measures were proposed to address 
this: 
1.  Koreans residing within Japan should be repatriated following the end of the 
war, with a clear conception of temporary work away from home (dekasegi).
2.  If Koreans living along the border of east Manchuria in northern Korea begin a 
relationship with the USSR and pose a threat, they should be moved to a 
different location and Japanese should be moved there collectively.
3. Koreans should be sent to “wastelands” such as New Guinea to pioneer.
4.  It should be engineered that native Japanese comprise at least ten percent of 
the population in Korea and Taiwan.
5.  As the governing policy of unity of Mainland Asia and Korea (Naisen ittai ron) 
in the transition period is resulting in native Japanese being pressured by 
Koreans, this should be rectified. (Oguma 2003, 331-32) 
The Japanese government, and in particular the Ministry of Health and Welfare 
bureaucrats who understood population problems as a pressing issue needing to 
be addressed, not only exhibited a sense of crisis directed abroad, but displayed 
an allergic reaction to the increase and migration of colonial populations. Here 
we can verify their plan not only to achieve racial purity within Japan, but also 
to preserve the superior status of ethnically Japanese populations in their colonies 
as well. 
In relation to this, the Ministry of Health and Welfare had collected survey 
data on the fertility of the Korean population living in Japan (administered 
August 1, 1940). This survey, completed in cooperation with the Central 
Concordia Association (Chūō Kyōwakai), had the purpose of “surveying what 
relationship one’s age of marriage, occupation, education level, income, and 
period of residency in Japan has with fertility.” The regions surveyed included 
the prefectures of Hokkaido, Tokyo, Kanagawa, Toyama, Aichi, Osaka, 
Yamaguchi, and Fukuoka, among other areas where many Koreans resided in 
Japan. In its survey methods, it operated on the principle of surveying for and 
recording common-law marriages (de facto marriages) and bigamy (in the case 
of having a wife in Korea) in the same category (“Naichi zaijū Chōsenjin 
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shussanryoku chōsa no shikō” 1940, 71). Marriages between Japanese and 
Korean people were a commonly witnessed social practice among the Korean 
community residing in Japan. This, of course, was desperately required attention 
from the perspective of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, which was fixated 
on the purity of Japanese ethnicity. 
Fertility surveys were also completed in colonial Korea. Between February 
and March 1944, the Governor-General of Korea surveyed the fertility of both 
Japanese settlers in colonial Korea (Zaichō Nihonjin) as well as native Koreans in 
five urban areas (Kyŏngsŏng-bu, P’yŏngyang-bu, Pusan-bu, Taegu-bu, and 
Hamhŭng-bu) and seven rural areas (Kyŏnggi-do P’yŏngt’aek-gun Songt’an-myŏn, 
Chŏnbuk Namwŏn-gun Unbong-myŏn, Kyŏngbuk Yŏngch’ŏn-gun Kŭmho-
myŏn11 Kyŏngnam Kimhae-gun Kimhae-ŭp Naedong-ri, Hwanghae-do Sŏhŭng-
gun Yongp’yŏng-myŏn Wŏlt’an-ri, P’yŏngbuk Kusŏng-gun Sŏsan-myŏn Ipsŏk-
dong, and Hamnam Chŏngp’yŏng-gun Shinsang-myŏn). As a sample survey, the 
fertility survey of urban areas was carried out by distributing questionnaires on 
fertility statistics to households with children in grades five and six of primary 
school and having their guardians fill them out. Additionally, as for its aim and 
purpose, it asserted: “Not only is the state of fertility of Japanese residing in 
Korea important from the perspective of the national project for population, but 
shedding light on the increasing Korean population, which will take charge of 
an aspect (ittan) of our great calling to erect the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity 
Sphere, has a greater significance beyond merely comparison with the fertility of 
our compatriots” (Chōsen Sōtoku Kanbō Chōsaka 1944b, 57). What is remarkable 
here comes from the comparison of the survey’s results (e.g., average age at first 
marriage) with six Japanese cities (Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Kyoto, Kobe, and 
Yokohama). In table 2, we can see that Korean natives were marrying at an 
earlier age than Japanese residing in either Korea or Japan (63). 
Next, the fertility survey investigating rural areas used an interview metho- 
dology in which full-time researchers visited sites, conducted interviews and 
listened to respondents. As it was conducted in the villages and surrounding 
areas in which a survey on household finances was also conducted, the survey 
region was defined as a purely rural region in which there were approximately 
150 domiciles. We can see in the results of this survey that the average age at the 
time of men’s first marriage was 21.15, and 17.01 for women, which clearly 
supports other findings regarding the prevalence of early marriage. Through 
comparison with the average found in six northeastern provinces in Japan (1938 
11. At first, only a survey of Kyŏngbuk Yŏngch’ŏn-gun Pugan-myŏn was planned, but due to traffic 
restrictions owing to the outbreak of a communicable disease, it was changed to Kŭmho-myŏn.
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survey, men: 26.62; women: 23.37) we can confirm that the age at the time of 
first marriage in Korea was markedly earlier than that in Japan (Chōsen Sōtoku 
Kanbō Chōsaka 1944a, 46-53). As the surveys examined above placed their 
focus on the fertility of Korean people, through this report—rough as it was—
we are able to see that, through early marriages, Korean people were exhibiting 
“a likelihood of fecundity” in comparison with the Japanese.
In short, we can be certain that population problems began to be discussed 
on a drastically different horizon than the past recognition of overpopulation as 
a crisis during the total-war period. Also, we can glean that for the bureaucrats 
at the Ministry of Health and Welfare, who had been proselytizing “Japanese 
racial purity,” the active growth of populations in the colonies was regarded with 
a renewed sense of crisis. 
US Occupation and Transitions in the Perception of Populations
1. Promotion of Birth Control: “Pressure” from Foreign Foundations
As we saw in figure 1, Japan experienced a bump in population in the late 1940s 
following the end of the war. In the years between 1947 and 1949, approximately 
8,060,000 babies were born. This was the so-called dankai sedai (baby-boomer 
generation). The dissemination of vaccines had extraordinary effectiveness in 
lowering the infant mortality rate. Nearly seven million people repatriated 
(hikiage) from the battlefields and colonies following the end of the Second 
World War. Large-scale famines were prevalent in cities. 
In the midst of this, the occupying authorities, the GHQ/SCAP, and their 
commander, General Douglas MacArthur, began to develop an interest in 
Japan’s population problems. First, an order was given by the GHQ/SCAP to 
conduct six population dynamic surveys between 1945 and 1950,12 and each 
12. These were conducted at the following times: September 1945, November 1945, October 1947, 
Table 2. Average age at the time of first marriage
Husband Wife
1. Six cities (Japan, 1938) 30.14 (Overall Japan 28.39)
25.76
(Overall Japan 24.41)
2. Survey of Japanese (1944) 26.53 21.58
3. Survey of Koreans (1944) 21.14 18.12
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year demographics were also compiled and reported on in Japanese newspapers. 
There were multiple reasons that the GHQ/SCAP began to scrutinize Japan’s 
population problems. First, it had to prevent malnutrition stemming from a 
scarcity of food and the spread of any infections due to famine (a problem that 
could also affect the occupying troops). Second, there was a worry that the food 
crisis could lead to hostility toward occupying troops or riots, and become a 
burden on occupational rule. Third, there was the influence of Warren S. 
Thompson’s theory, which viewed the pressures of overpopulation as a central 
reason for Japan’s imperialist conquests (Ogino 2008, 142-43). In a text he wrote 
in 1950, Thompson (1950, 33) warned that Japanese imperialism would resurge 
within a single generation. Urging that Japan had to forgo the practices of 
foreign expansion or immigration to which it had grown accustomed, Thompson 
claimed that the best policy to achieve this would be fertility control (Homei 
2016, 228). 
The GHQ/SCAP adhered to a policy of “neutrality” regarding Japan’s popul- 
ation problems and took a position of autonomy in the matter.13 There were a 
number of factors and developing contexts that influenced this decision. First 
among them was that the entire world was entranced by the ongoing Nuremberg 
trials in Germany, particularly as the Nazis’ inhumane racial policies and 
sterilization policies were coming to light. In this context, the GHQ/SCAP wanted 
to avoid any suspicions that it was forcing birth control on Japan, for fear it 
would only invite comparison to genocide. Another interesting background to 
this decision was the objections that those of Catholic faith had to birth control, 
both in the US and Japan. And finally, the US was committed to “not providing 
an excuse” to the USSR that could be used against them in their negotiations 
now that the Cold War was getting under way (Ogino 2008, 145; Oakley 1978, 
625). 
Although progress was slow because of this “neutrality” on the part of the 
GHQ/SCAP and “proxy observation” through the Japanese, the parties that 
began actually to impose some pressure were private US foundations and 
demographers interested in Japan. American demographers and social science 
experts including Marshall C. Balfour, Roger F. Evans, Frank W. Notestein, and 
Irene B. Taeuber visited Japan in September 1948 as members of the 1948 
Rockefeller Mission on Public Health in the Far East. Besides Japan, this mission 
was to visit and conduct observations in Korea, Taiwan, China, Indonesia, and 
the Philippines. Following two weeks of observation conducted all around 
August 1948, and October 1950 (Oakley 1978, 622). 
13. Oakley (1978) defined the GHQ/SCAP’s position as one of “protective neutralism.”
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Japan, they released a report (Balfour et al. 1950). In their report, these scholars 
and professionals claimed that Japan held fast to its “nostalgia for imperialism” 
and unconsciously regarded an increase in population as a signifier of the 
nation’s wellbeing or vitality. The report delineated this attitude of the Japanese, 
stating that “eugenic fears were widespread; it was often stated that reduction in 
fertility would occur first in the ‘better’ classes and so would jeopardize the 
‘quality’ of the ‘race’, ” and that “the majority of the Japanese appear unable or 
unwilling to face the magnitude of the population problem,” as well as claiming 
that “there was hesitation concerning birth control as an immediate solution.” 
Despite expressing their criticism in the harshest terms, because the involvement 
of “a military conqueror” in the birth rates of an occupied nation could precipitate 
political misgivings, they conceded that any actions by which they could approach 
these problems would inevitably be complex (Balfour et al. 1950, 35, 43). 
Among those visiting Japan for the sake of research were Notestein and 
Taeuber, both of whom worked at the Office of Population Research (OPR)14 at 
Princeton University. Notestein and Taeuber, along with two other demographers, 
Kingsley Davis15 and Dudley Kirk, were famous for coming up with a model of 
historical demographic transition16 that fitted within the framework of modern- 
ization theory. Predicting a “population explosion in Asia” in 1945, Davis 
14. The OPR was the recipient of large grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie 
Institute, the World Bank, and the US State Department, among other sources. 
15. Kingsley Davis (1908-97): An American demographer, Davis earned his Ph.D. in Sociology at 
Harvard University in 1936, after which he lectured at Pennsylvania State University, Princeton 
University, Columbia University, and the University of California at Berkley, among others. 
Alongside his student—and later, wife—Judith Blake, he emphasized that human fertility was 
intimately related to social structures. He suggested a set of eleven intermediate variables which 
mediated the relationship between social structure and fertility. Enumerating this in his study 
(Davis and Blake 1956), he claimed that because the motivation for, and values placed on, giving 
birth are closely interrelated with social structures, the enterprise of family planning, which 
proposes to provide information, knowledge, and services related to contraception to individuals in 
order to change their actions related to fertility without consideration of changes in social structure, 
social transformation, or development, achieves less than satisfactory results in comparison to the 
efforts and costs which are required of them (Han’guk In’gu Hakhoe 2006, 74-75). 
16. Demographic Transition Theory: A model first put forth by Notestein in 1953, and subsequently 
modified by numerous other scholars, it is a theory which posits the demographic changes that 
occurred in the West following the industrial revolution as the general model. This theory focuses 
on the fact that the patterns of population growth undergo changes according to the apparent lag 
between fertility rates and death rates, depending on the development of science and technology, 
and the progress of industrialization. That is to say, populations transform in a pattern of “high 
death rates/high fertility rates → low death rates/high fertility rates → low death rates/low fertility 
rates.” But in particular, this theory emphasizes that during the “low death rates/high fertility rates” 
period, which is brought about thanks to the development of medical technology, there will be a 
temporary explosion in population (Kwŏn Tae-hwan and Kim Tu-sŏp 2002).
 Japanese Population Politics  159
claimed that once Asian populations were able to enjoy a modern life, Europe 
would become a casualty of this change. That is to say, as non-Western regions 
began to adopt the technologies of the West, the tendency of continued popu- 
lation growth would worsen. This was already a phenomenon being witnessed 
in places such as Java and Malaysia, and one that was incipient in Iran, China, 
and Brunei. In the eyes of these scholars, the only actionable means of stopping 
an explosion of population in these countries were economic development, 
urbanization, and industrialization, and they believed that in pursuing these 
goals, they could transform the traditional values surrounding the family.17
However, with the arrival of the late 1940s, this attitude, which viewed fertility 
as a dependent variable of modernization, was rejected, and a more aggressive, 
interventionist approach toward modifying reproduction was beginning to gain 
recognition. After completing his observations in Asia, Notestein noted in 1948 
that contraception was an incredibly decisive and powerful means of population 
control and therefore there was no better choice. At the time, US policy officials, 
private foundations, non-governmental organizations, and research institute 
employees viewed the rapid growth of populations as preventing economic 
development and thus exacerbating poverty—and thus possibly precipitating a 
communist insurrection. There were concerns that population growth in the 
Third World could displace and metastasize the East-West Cold War into a North-
South struggle between the rich and poor (Latham 2011, 95-99). However, as 
population control in the Third World being enacted by the US provided suf- 
ficient grounds to invite a backlash calling out imperialism or racism, inter- 
mediary organizations such as the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation, 
the Population Council, and the International Planned Parenthood Federation18 
17. Brigadier General Crawford Sams, who was serving as the chief of the Public Health and 
Welfare Division, was among those at GHQ/SCAP who actively voiced this opinion. He criticized 
the policy of suppressing postwar Japan’s industrialization—that is, the degrading of Japan into an 
agricultural country beneath even the level of Korea, China, or the Philippines—as had been put in 
place by the GHQ, and asserted that in order to regulate the population, the authorities should be 
moving in the direction of approving of Japanese industrialization (Ogino, 2008, 144-45). This 
assertion was a part of the expanding US plan to transform Japan into a stable capitalist country, 
making it a bulwark of anti-communism in Asia. This came as there was mounting crisis 
surrounding the US occupation of Asia in the form of anti-Americanism, communization, and 
people’s liberation struggles occurring on the Korean peninsula, in mainland China, and in 
Indonesia (Fujime 2004, 343-44). 
18. Due to population control being an extremely sensitive topic, rather than directly taking action 
in its own name, the Rockefeller Foundation created an executive organ that it funded monetarily. 
In 1952, a seminar on population problems was hosted at the Rockefeller Foundation, a meeting 
that resulted in the establishment of the Population Council in 1953. During this era, alongside 
concerns surrounding rapid population growth, there was an ongoing, complex discussion of the 
ethical concerns surrounding the use of contraceptives and family planning as a concept, as well as 
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took over important duties on behalf of the US government (Ogino 2008, 179). 
2.  Realignments of Perceptions and Conflicts Surrounding Population 
Control 
This plan to resolve Japan’s population problems through fertility control, 
however, did not trigger a particular sensation at first. In many instances, 
thinkers with a background in academia suggested plans other than fertility 
control. For example, there were those who advocated immigration, reindus- 
trialization, and agricultural policy reform as solutions. Figures such as 
Minoguchi Tokijirō, who approached the issue from an industrial perspective, 
argued that Japan needed to focus on the revitalization of industry rather than 
fertility control. From eugenicists and medical doctors there were cries con- 
cerning eugenic reverse-selection and biological atrophy. For example, Okazaki, 
who was head of the Institute for Population Problems, published a book in 
1946 entitled Population of Worry (Kumon no jinkō), in which he posited the 
idea that although it was easy to see birth control as a remedy for overpopulation 
and food shortages, by carrying out birth control Japan would lose potential 
populations that possessed talents and aptitudes, and would thus arrive at the 
“suicide of the ethnicity,” which Japan must absolutely avoid. Furthermore, there 
were many who understood fertility control in postwar Japan as being linked 
with the “underdeveloping” of the country following the loss of its colonies, and 
opposed it on those grounds (Homei 2016, 229; Ogino 2008, 157). 
It was in this context that the young bureaucrats and demographers at the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare emerged, calling for the introduction of fertility 
control. Ironic as it may be, these young bureaucrats included Tachi Minoru, 
Kitaoka Juitsu, and Koya Yoshio, who had worked for the Institute of Population 
Problems and the Ministry of Health and Welfare Research Institute during the 
war, and who had participated in the enactment and realization of the 
Population Policy Establishment Guidelines. Following the Second World War, 
these scholars aligned with Warren Thompson and other GHQ/SCAP advisers, 
and began to receive assistance from various US foundations, continuing down 
the path toward the introduction of birth control policy in Japan.19 In short, 
the eugenic considerations relating to birth control. In the midst of this, the Population Council 
took charge of disseminating the scientific results of medical, public health, and social research to 
governments and individuals in various countries (Han’guk In’gu Hakhoe 2006, 56-64, 325-26).
19. Warren Thompson stayed in Japan for three months as a consultant for the Natural Resources 
Section of the GHQ/SCAP. At the time, he was the director of the Scripps Foundation for Research 
in Population Problems. He worked in collaboration with the vice-director of the foundation, P.K. 
Whelpton, who remained in Japan for three months after Thompson had returned to the US 
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there was a remarkable “conversion.” Koya even went so far as to remark that it 
was inevitable that he would be the subject of all sorts of criticism for his 
180-degree reversal of position, and that he would not attempt to make the 
excuse of having been blinded by military propaganda and anticipating victory 
in the war (Fujime 2004, 345-46). 
Although he was one of the figures who had participated in the inception of 
the National Eugenic Act, Koya had also played a key role in the drafting of the 
Eugenic Protection Act. A decisive part of the reason why Koya came to accept 
fertility control as a viable alternative was that he understood population as no 
longer an issue of quantity, but an issue of quality. Though he was of course 
concerned that fertility control would bring about reverse-selection, in the 
process of participating in the drawing up of the Eugenic Protection Act his 
views were changed. Through the concept of differential fertility, he advocated 
the view that there was a necessity to carry out population control on the lower 
social strata. Koya, who was employed as the director of the National Institute of 
Public Health (NIPH) following 1946, received funding from the Rockefeller 
Foundation as well as Clarence J. Gamble,20 and along with a research team from 
the NIPH, began an ambitious project. Starting in early 1950 with three model 
villages, his team surveyed 6,936 people about birth control over seven years. 
Providing contraception at low prices or even for free, they explored the rela- 
tionship between practicing contraception and declines in birth rates (conception 
control survey [jutai chōsetsu chōsa]), observing a fall in the crude birth rate of 
26.7 per thousand people to 13.6 per thousand. Koya utilized the findings of this 
survey as justifying data for the introduction of birth control policy (Homei 
2016, 235; Ogino 2008, 180). 
It is plain to see that US civic organizations, with the Rockefeller Foundation 
at the head, took a significant interest in broadening the activities of Japanese 
researchers and empowering their voices. The Rockefeller research group 
introduced above suggested the following: 
(Balfour et al. 1950, 49). Understanding the influence of Thompson and Whelpton on GHQ/SCAP 
and Japanese scholars requires further analysis. 
20. Clarence J. Gamble: Executive at Ivory Soap (Procter & Gamble) and pharmacologist. Founder 
of Pathfinder International. Gamble funded the Ministry of Health and Welfare’s Institute for 
Population Problems’ Shinojaki Nobuo’s fact-finding survey on birth control and donated the 
publication funds for the journal of the Japanese Population Association (est. 1949). Additionally, 
although it was ultimately unsuccessful, he suggested that Koya Yoshio, Tachi Minoru, and Kitaoka 
Juitsu apply for a grant of US$1,000,000 from the Ford Foundation for the purpose of population 
control research. In this way, he was a patron of, and advisor on, population policy and the family-
planning movement in postwar Japan. 
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The direct role of SCAP and the American government is limited, for the 
population problem is fundamentally the responsibility of the Japanese. Thus, 
cooperation with them becomes crucial. The techniques for achieving that 
cooperation are similar to those in other aspects of culture today in which there 
are active program [sic] of technical assistance and intellectual interchange … 
The selection of individual scholar [sic] for study in the United States and the 
extension of government training programs to include Japanese students would 
contribute to the extension of technical knowledge and diffuse the concept of 
research as an aid in the formulation of policy. (Balfour et al. 1950, 48) 
This knowledge transplantation pattern, which comprised the dissemination of 
population control technologies and an expansion of knowledge achieved by 
sending the local intellectual elite to study abroad, (re)education, and aiding 
their research was repeated in the same manner in other East Asian countries 
and territories, such as Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong (Kim In-soo 2015; Huang 
2009). 
3.  Postwar Fertility Surveys and Transitions in Understandings of Population
As I have shown above, private US foundations wielded great influence, both 
directly and indirectly, over the fertility control policies of postwar Japan. These 
policies were in large measure evidence-based, using data collected in 
observations and through surveys. During this era, the Journal of Population 
Problems published abridged versions of the findings of various types of 
surveys, but among these, the most important to note are the Rural Population 
Capacity Survey (“Nōson jinkō shūyōryoku ni kansuru chōsa” 1947), the Fact-
Finding Survey on Contraception,21 and the Fact-Finding Survey on Birth 
Control22 (Shinozaki, Kaneko, and Kobayashi 1948), as well as public opinion 
21. According to its investigators, this was the first survey to study contraception use in Japan. If 
we turn our attention to the “questions regarding contraception,” we can learn that those surveyed 
were asked about the fertility (or sterility) of couples, whether they had ever undergone a steri- 
lization operation or X-rays on their reproductive organs, whether they had practiced contracep- 
tion, why they had practiced contraception, the method of contraception that they had practiced, 
the extent to which they had practiced contraception, the period and time in which they had 
practiced contraception, the extent of their of knowledge of contraception, whether or not con- 
traception had been successful, whether they had hoped to use contraception, whether they had 
asked for information regarding methods of contraception, their opinions on how many children a 
couple could raise, as well as asking those who were currently pregnant whether they wished to 
induce abortions, and why or why not that was the case (“Hinin jittai chōsa no shikō”  1947, 53). 
22. This is covered in the first report, which analyzed the results of information gathered in 
January and April 1947.  
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surveys on birth control.23 However, central among these was the fertility survey.
A nationwide survey of fertility was conducted in 1952, the second of its 
kind since the first was completed in 1940. The survey was administered as of 
the “Present: July 1, 1952,” and it was suggested that, “As this survey is being 
completed ten years following the fertility survey administered in January of 
1940, we must be sure to obtain a more representative national sample in com- 
parison with the earlier round [in 1940], through a sample survey.” Additionally, 
it was special in that it would “be administered alongside the labor capacity 
survey of the Bureau of Statistics of the Office of the Prime Minister.” Taking 
into account the various extreme circumstances of the previous ten years 
spanning the war and following it, the guidelines for the survey (April 30, 1952) 
focused on revealing the trends and reality of fertility between over the past ten 
years (“Shōwa 27-nendo shussanryoku chōsa no shikō” 1952, 58).24     
In the findings of this survey (1952), we can see that there was a crucial 
change in the fertility trends in Japan’s population. Prior to the war, the more 
affluent a Japanese farmer was, the more likely they were to have many children, 
and the less affluent, the more that poverty and overwork put pressure on 
fertility (“pre-modern configuration”). The following are the average numbers 
of children borne by farming couples, as categorized by the size of their 
landholdings, from the survey conducted in 1940.
The 1952 survey divided these classes not by the area of the land that they 
23. The Population Problem Investigative Committee of the Mainichi Newspaper Co. Ltd., 
established in July 1949, carried out a “Public Opinion Survey on the Correction of Over- 
population” in April 1950. Minoguchi Tokijirō, Tachi Minoru, and Kosaka Hiromi were among 
those who participated in this investigation. The results were published in Honda (1951). For 
outcomes, see page 80. 
24. One chōbu is equal to approximately 9917.4 m2 and one tanbu corresponds to one-tenth of one 
chōbu.
Table 3. Average number of children of farming couples by area of cultivation 
Less than 5 tanbu24 4.32
5 tanbu – 1 chōbu 4.92
1 chōbu – 2 chōbu 5.47
2 chōbu – 3 chōbu 5.96
Greater than 5 chōbu 6.18
Source: Honda (1957, 8).
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tilled, but by the total amount of monthly out-of-pocket spending. Table 4 is a 
comparison of the differential fertility of couples before and after the war. 
The author of this report remarked: “We can be certain that birth control 
was adopted at a remarkable level even within the upper class of farmers 
following the war,” going on to say that by comparing the population trends of 
prewar Japan with prewar China and eighteenth-century German rural areas, 
Japan during that era could be classified as having “premodern differential 
fertility” (Honda 1957, 10-11). Later in the report, the author compares postwar 
population trends with those in the UK, Sweden, and America’s fertility by 
occupation, and highlights the fact that Japan was gradually aligning with the 
population trends of US and European developed nations, in which the more 
affluent a couple, the more they calculate and plan for a reasonable family size 
(12-16). Assessing Sweden’s differential fertility model as the final endpoint of 
modern differential fertility, the author claims that this endpoint is characterized 
by a relatively low disparity between fertility among social classes, and overall 
lower fertility within a society where there is a high quality of life and a com- 
paratively equitable distribution of social class achieved through the develop- 
ment of capitalism. He expressed the view that this was an indicator of the 
capacity for self-regulation possessed by modern citizens, and the ideal 
population dynamic of a democratic society (19). 
This discussion outlines clearly how Japanese demographers of the time 
understood the fertility trends of their society, as well as how they accorded 
meaning to them. For instance, prewar Japan was in the “premodern configur- 
ation,” in which the upper classes experienced high fertility, while the lower 
classes experienced low fertility. In comparison with this, postwar Japan 
gradually exhibited rational regulation and standardization, which was taken as 
surely signaling the birth of a civil subject of postwar democracy. This begs the 
question: What if we were to understand this as evidence that the politics of 
Table 4. Differential fertility prewar and postwar
Total Upper class Middle class Lower class Poverty class
Prewar (1940) 5.34 6.00 5.37 4.66 4.35
Postwar (1952) 4.13 4.62 4.64 3.32 3.92
Quotient
Prewar (1940) 100 100 100 100 100
Postwar (1952) 77 77 86 71 90
Source: Honda (1957, 10).
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birth control enacted under the “mutual assistance” of the GHQ/SCAP and 
private foundations was being gradually internalized in Japan? 
Closing Remarks
Population politics have undergone fundamental transformations over the 
course of history in Japan. From the establishment and formation of a modern 
nation following the Meiji era to imperialist invasions and colonization, from 
total war and mass mobilization to defeat and the US occupation, and finally to 
postwar democracy. The fortification of a healthy and vibrant new ethnic 
population, that is, the comprehension and management of fertility, was at the 
core of these population politics. Through the discussion in the body of this 
article, I have made clear the following two points. 
The first is that the frame through which Japan viewed population in the 
earlier half of the twentieth century underwent a series of transformations, 
starting with “overpopulation theory,” which gave way to “declining population 
society theory/resource population theory,” and finally, “birth control theory.” 
The problem of rural overpopulation was understood in relation to the issues of 
food shortages and unemployment, and thus industrialization and foreign 
immigration were seen as its solution, yet birth control was always excluded as 
an option in the fight against overpopulation. The thought that overpopulation 
could be resolved through immigration to Japanese colonies was prevalent, 
stemming both from the notion of regarding population as a type of material 
resource during the era of total war, as well as the concerned attempt to learn 
from the mistakes of European nations that were transitioning into societies 
characterized by population decline. Japan’s administration, as represented by 
the Ministry of Health and Welfare, observed and analyzed fertility patterns in 
relation to urban/rural residency as well as occupation, and used the findings of 
these surveys as the basis for the enactment of the Population Policy Establish- 
ment Guidelines, continuing down the route of population increase. The 
transition from a population policy firmly invested in population growth to one 
of population control by means of birth control came about during the era of 
occupation by the GHQ/SCAP between 1945 and 1952. Both internally and 
externally, the GHQ/SCAP purported to remain neutral on the issue of Japan’s 
population problems due to the optics of interference, but in their stead and 
supplement were private US foundations. In particular, the Rockefeller 
Foundation operated under the assumption that rapid population growth would 
exacerbate poverty, which could prompt a communist revolution. Thus, these 
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foundations played an active role in intervening in the population problems of 
East Asia, with Japan being a central subject of their involvement in the region. 
It would be inaccurate to say that there was no resistance to birth control among 
the general public or professionals within Japan, but as Japanese scholars, 
funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, took up surveys monitoring fertility, 
among other things, opinion gradually turned toward an acceptance of birth 
control. Birth control, involving contraception and abortion, was practiced in 
everyday life, and as a result, Japan’s fertility rapidly declined as the country 
entered the 1950s. 
Second, an obsession with the racial purity and the supposed supremacy of 
the Japanese ethnic population was always at the heart of Japan’s population 
politics. By occasionally comparing the results of Japan’s fertility surveys with 
nearby Asian nations such as India, the USSR, and China, the country’s low 
fertility rates were consumed in a manner that manufactured a security crisis. 
Population concerned bureaucrats and scholars, who recognized Japan’s low 
fertility rates in comparison with other nations, as well as the continued decline 
in birth rates following the 1920s, as a crisis. Similarly, the high fertility rates of 
colonized populations were spoken of with a sense of urgency. The Japanese 
state, alongside its colonial authorities, conducted surveys of the fertility of 
Korean people living in Japan, as well as Japanese living in Korea and Korean 
locals in an attempt to track and observe the degree of growth in these 
population groups. This disposition on the part of Japan led to the “politics of 
expulsion of Koreans residing in Japan” by the Japanese state following 1945. 
That is, it would not be an overstatement to claim that while the unemployment 
issues prevalent in the community of Koreans residing in Japan were established 
as a deep-seated and enduring problem for which the Japanese state and society 
abandoned responsibility, they became the backdrop for their attempt to 
“relieve” themselves of Koreans residing in Japan via “humanitarian repatriation” 
to North Korea (Kim In-soo 2017).  
There is a need to re-examine the grand lifecycle of Japan’s population 
fluctuations, which have moved from “overpopulation” to a “low-fertility, aging 
society,” from the perspective of the “political construction of population 
discourse.” My hope is that the analysis presented here can be of some value to 
us now in inspecting the significance of population problems and discourses of 
population in a more detailed manner in Korea—and more broadly, East Asia—
which finds itself on the horns of a similar dilemma. 
• Translated by Grace PAYER
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